讲座人：郑登津 讲师

讲座主题：董事网络中心度和系统性风险

摘要：We find that the boardroom centrality formed by sharing directors across firms can significantly increase firms’ systematic risk estimated by the beta coefficient of the CAPM model/FF model. The results are robust after addressing the endogenous issues with the two-stage least square estimation with the instrumental variables based on exogenous changes in directors’ boardship outside the focal firm. Such positive effects are stronger when boardroom centrality is formed by inside executive directors, more experienced directors, and directors who also sit on other large firms, stock market index included firms. We also find that boardroom centrality can increase corporate policy and fundamental correlations between the appointing firm and other firms in the markets. Final, board centrality is positively associated with firms’ cost of equity and negatively related to firm value after controlling firms’ expected future cash flows. Taken together, the findings of this paper highlight the roles of corporate leaders in affecting firms’ systematic risk and cost of equity, which have been highly neglected by the literature.

讲座时间：2018年6月27日，周三，19：00开始

讲座地点：学院南路学术会堂202

讲座人简介：郑登津，现任我校best365体育官网平台讲师。2017年获得清华大学大学工商管理学博士（会计学），曾在新加坡管理大学交流访问、担任研究助理。主要研究兴趣包括公司治理、公司财务、审计等领域。曾在Journal of Accounting and Public Policy、China Journal of Accounting Studies、管理世界、会计研究、南开管理评论、审计研究、中国会计评论等国内外重要期刊发表论文10余篇。曾两次获得研究生国家奖学金、清华大学优秀博士论文一等奖、魏杰优秀经济学论文奖、小林实中国经济研究奖、第十五届实证会计国际研讨会优秀论文奖等学术奖励。